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Abstract: This paper proposes an immunity-based anomaly detection system with sensor 
agents based on the specificity and diversity of the immune system. Each agent is 
specialized to react to the behavior of a specific user. Multiple diverse agents decide 
whether the behavior is normal or abnormal. Conventional systems have used only a single 
sensor to detect anomalies, while the immunity-based system makes use of multiple 
sensors, which leads to improvements in detection accuracy. In addition, we propose an 
evaluation framework for the anomaly detection system, which is capable of evaluating the 
differences in detection accuracy between internal and external anomalies. This paper 
focuses on anomaly detection in user’s command sequences on UNIX-like systems. In 
experiments, the immunity-based system outperformed some of the best conventional 
systems. 
Keywords: immunity-based system; anomaly detection; intrusion detection; sensor agent; 
hidden Markov model; receiver operating characteristics 
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1. Introduction 
 
Intrusion detection on the Internet is a pressing problem for the Information Society. Intrusion 
detection in user behavior can be divided into two approaches: misuse detection and anomaly detection. 
Misuse detection systems use sensors to monitor and scan for known misuses, while anomaly detection 
systems have sensors that monitor and detect deviations from normal behavior. The misuse detection 
system sensor can detect misuse by a malicious user. However, the sensor would have difficulty in 
detecting unknown types of misuse because of a lack of information regarding the specific misuse. In 
an anomaly detection system, the sensor has the potential to detect misuse by evaluating deviations 
from normal behavior, even if the specific details of the type of misuse are unknown. However, 
anomaly detection systems sometimes gives rise to false alarms, which can result in “the boy who 
cried wolf” syndrome. The objective of anomaly detection is to reduce missed alarms without giving 
rise to false alarms. This paper focuses on anomaly detection of a masquerader using someone else’s 
account on a multiuser system, such as a UNIX-like system. 
Studies on masquerader detection have employed various approaches, including incremental 
probabilistic action modeling (IPAM) [1], hidden Markov models (HMM) [2,3], the uniqueness 
approach [4], etc. The uniqueness method outperforms the hybrid multistep Markov method [5], Bayes 
1-step Markov method [6], compression method [7], sequence-match method [8], and IPAM   
method [1] with a false alarm rate between 1% and 5% [7]. These methods have been restricted to 
systems using a single sensor. One drawback of the single sensor is that many false alarms arise when 
a valid user carries out new operations they have never performed previously. 
In this paper, we propose an immunity-based anomaly detection system with multiple sensor agents 
based on the specificity and diversity of the biological immune system, in which each immune cell has 
a unique receptor that has a high affinity for only specific antigens. Similarly, each of our agents has a 
unique sensor, which reacts strongly to the behavior of a specific user. When a user types a command 
sequence, all the agents check their own score of the command sequence by their sensor. On the basis 
of all the scores, one of the agents determines whether the user is a masquerader or not. That is, our 
approach makes use of multiple sensors rather than a single sensor, which leads to an improvement in 
masquerader detection accuracy. 
In performance evaluation, detection accuracy has been evaluated with no distinction between users 
internal and external to a LAN. In general, anomaly detection methods use the information of only 
internal users. This causes a difference in detection accuracy between internal and external users, 
because the detection accuracy is proportional to the amount of user behavior information available. 
However, the difference has been ignored in performance evaluations of anomaly detection. Here, we 
introduce an evaluation framework that is capable of evaluating the differences in detection accuracy 
between internal and external users.  
Artificial immune systems for computer security can be divided roughly into three types [9]: hybrid 
approaches combined with multiple conventional detection methods [10-12], approaches inspired by 
the mechanism of negative selection in the thymus [13-17], and approaches motivated by the danger Sensors 2009, 9                  
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theory [18-21]. Our system is related to those using the second approach. These systems randomly 
generate short sequences, and those matching normal sequences, i.e., self, such as system calls, are 
eliminated in advance. The remaining sequences are defined as anomalous sequences, i.e., nonself, and 
these sequences are used for anomaly detection. However, such systems reported previously do not 
outperform the single-sensor method using the HMM [16]. The important difference in intrusion 
detection between our system and those reported previously is the reference information used for 
detection. Previous systems referred only to nonself information, while our system refers to both self 
and nonself information. This reference to self information contributes to a reduction in false alarms. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the framework 
of the conventional anomaly detection method, and Section 3 presents the new immunity-based 
anomaly detection system with multiple sensor agents. Section 4 introduces a new evaluation 
framework for the immunity-based anomaly detection system. Section 5 presents the results of our 
experiments to determine the effectiveness of the immunity-based method, and discusses how to 
further improve detection accuracy. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6. 
 
2. Anomaly Detection 
 
The aim of anomaly detection is to prevent intruders and masqueraders from abusing computers and 
networks. Anomaly detection detects deviation from normal behavior. Therefore, in contrast to misuse 
detection, anomaly detection has the potential to detect unknown anomalous behavior. 
An anomaly detection system requires construction of a profile for each user in advance. The profile 
accounts for the normal behavior of a user. The user behavior is expressed by an operation sequence, 
such as a command history, web history, etc. To date, such profiles have been constructed using 
various algorithms: HMM, IPAM, Bayes 1-step Markov method, etc. Constructing the profile requires 
operation sequences, called “training data” in the field of artificial intelligence, which are not evaluated 
as “test data”. The profile yields the likelihood that an operation sequence is performed by the original 
user, corresponding to the original user’s profile. 
After construction of user profiles, the system moves on to the test stage, in which it monitors 
operation sequences and computes the likelihood of the operation sequence with the profile 
corresponding to the account on which the command sequence is performed. If the likelihood is above 
a certain threshold, the operation sequence is considered normal, i.e., the user who performed the 
operation sequence is the legitimate owner of the account on which the operation sequence was 
performed. If not, the operation sequence is deemed abnormal, i.e., the user is not the legitimate owner 
of the account. 
Here, we review how to discriminate between normal and abnormal operation sequences. In the 
user discrimination stage, the anomaly detection system computes the likelihood of an operation 
sequence with a single profile corresponding to an account on which a user performed the operation 
sequence. The other profiles are not used at all. Sensors 2009, 9                  
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The profile of the account on which the user performed the operation sequence provides the 
likelihood that the user is a legitimate user. All the other profiles provide the likelihood that the user is 
not a legitimate user. That is, all the other profiles have the potential for detecting non-legitimate users, 
such as intruders or masqueraders. Hence, we propose a new framework for anomaly detection using 
not only the profile of the account on which the user performed the operation sequence, but also all the 
other profiles. 
 
3. Immunity-Based System for Detecting Masqueraders 
 
3.1. Definitions of “Self” and “Nonself” 
 
The heart of the biological immune system is the ability to distinguish between “self” (i.e., the 
body’s own molecules, cells, and tissues) and “nonself” (i.e., foreign substances, such as viruses or 
bacteria). Similarly, command sequences executed by a user on his/her own account are defined as 
“self”, and all other sequences are defined as “nonself”. For example, if one user executes commands 
on his/her own account, the command sequence is “self”. If another user executes commands on 
someone else’s account, the command sequence is “nonself”. Such a user is defined as a masquerader 
or an intruder, regardless of whether the user’s actions are malicious. 
In the immunity-based anomaly detection system, command sequences per user in the training data 
belong absolutely to “self”. The command sequences are used for constructing a profile per user (using 
the algorithm described in Section 3.2). The profile yields the probability that the command sequence 
belongs to “self”. Based on this probability, the system classifies the command sequence as either 
belonging or not belonging to “self” as described in Section 3.3. 
 
3.2. Generation of Agents 
 
Immune cells have a unique receptor with high affinity for only specific antigens. Similarly, our 
immunity-based system generates a user-specific agent for every user, i.e., every account. Each agent 
has a unique sensor to represent the probability that the command sequence is performed by the 
original user. The probability is expressed by a score, which is derived from the detection method, i.e., 
HMM, IPAM, the Bayes 1-step Markov method, etc. We chose the HMM method because previous 
studies indicated that the HMM performs well [3,16]. We formally define the following notation for 
the HMM [22]: 
 
   Length of a command sequence 
   Number of command sequences 
      ,  ,…,     Command sequences 
           
 ,   
 ,…,   
    Command sequence where   
   is  the  l
th command in the k
th 
command sequence 
   Number of hidden states for the HMM Sensors 2009, 9                  
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   Number of commands used in training data 
     ,   ,…,   ,…,   ,        Discrete set of commands used in training data, such as “ls”, 
“gcc”, “less”, etc. (only      represents all commands not seen in 
the training data), where     is an identification number and 
1     1  
              State transition probability where  ,  is a state and 1   ,     
               Command probability distribution in state    where     is  a 
command number and 1     1  and 1      
         Initial state distribution where   is a state and 1      
    |    Likelihood of the command sequence    with the profile   
 
The parameter of the HMM is given by λ = [A, B, π, V], and corresponds to a single “user profile”, 
which accounts for user behavior. The parameter V is determined by command sequences seen 
previously in the training data as described in Section 5.1. Note that vM+1 represents all commands not 
previously seen in the training data. 
The parameter A, B ,  π,  is estimated from the training data composed of command sequences 
obtained previously from each user. The parameter estimation is conducted using the following Baum-
Welch algorithm [22]. 
1. Generate the parameter A, B, π randomly. 
2. Estimate the parameter   ,   ,    using the following equations: 
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where: 
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  (7) 
3. Iterate Step 2 using   ,   ,    in place of  , ,  until the iteration count reaches 1,000. 
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In this algorithm, bj(M + 1) is estimated to be 0.0, because there are no commands corresponding to 
vM+1; i.e., the likelihood     |  , which will be described in the next paragraph, would produce zero 
probability for any sequence that includes vM+1, even though vM+1 is not always used by masqueraders. 
Such zero probability significantly degrades detection accuracy. To solve this problem, we replace 
   
     with the minimum probability,  , if    
     is less than   in Step 2 based on the method of 
parameter thresholding [22].  
The agent can compute the likelihood     |   of the command sequence    with the profile  . The 
likelihood     |   represents the probability that the command sequence    was performed by the 
original user corresponding to the agent, i.e., the profile  . The likelihood     |   is obtained by: 
    |        
    
 
   
  (8) 
The agent would compute a high likelihood, i.e., a high score, for only the sequences of the original 
user corresponding to the agent. That is, the agent would recognize a specific user. 
 
3.3. Discrimination of Self and Nonself 
 
Our immunity-based system has a user-specific sensor agent for every account. All the agents on a 
computer communicate with each other, and one of the agents makes a decision on whether the 
command sequence is “self”, i.e., the command sequence is performed by the original user. 
The discrimination process is as follows:  
Step 1. Each agent monitors commands on its own account until the length of the command 
sequence reaches  . 
Step 2. The agent of the account on which the length of the command sequence reaches   is 
activated. 
Step 3.   The activated agent shares the command sequence with all the other agents. 
Step 4.   All agents compute their own score of the command sequence. 
Step 5.   The activated agent computes the effective threshold,             –           , where 
    is the minimum score of all scores,     is the maximum score of all scores, and    
is the percentage difference between     and    . 
Step 6.   The activated agent compares its own score,  , with the effective threshold,  . 
Step 7. If    , the activated agent classifies the command sequence as normal, i.e., self. 
Otherwise, the agent classifies the command sequence as abnormal, i.e., nonself. 
Exceptionally, provided that   is equal to the minimum value of     |  , i.e.,   , the 
sequence is regarded as abnormal. Conversely, the sequence is regarded as normal if   is 
equal to the maximum value of     |   , i.e., 1.0. 
Step 8.   If the activated agent decides that the command sequence is abnormal, it raises an alarm to 
a systems administrator. 
Step 9.   The activated agent returns to a normal state, and the process returns to Step 1. 
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The flow diagram is also shown in Figure 1. Examples of user discrimination are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1. Flow diagram for discrimination of self and nonself. 
 
 
 
No 
(Abnormal)
Each agent monitors and collects commands. 
The agent of the account is activated. 
The activated agent shares the command sequence with all the other agents. 
All agents compute their own score of the command sequence. 
The activated agent computes the effective threshold. 
The activated agent compares its own score,  , with the effective threshold,  . 
The activated agent 
raises an alarm. 
The length of the 
sequence is equal to  ? 
Yes 
(Normal) 
The activated agent returns to a normal state. 
     and   0 . 0  
or 
    1.0?
Yes 
Start 
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Figure 2. Discrimination of self (a) and nonself (b). There are five users on a computer. 
An agent is generated on every account. Let the threshold    be 80%. When these agents 
compute scores of 69, 75, 20, 55, and 10, the effective threshold value   
is 62     10 + (75 – 10 ) × 0.80 . (a) When user A executes a command sequence on 
his/her own account, agent A of account A is activated, and the activated agent decides that 
the command sequence is normal as the score of the activated agent is ≥  62. (b) When user 
A executes a command sequence on account E, agent E of account E is activated, and the 
activated agent decides that the command sequence is abnormal as the score of the 
activated agent is <  62. 
 
 
(a) “self” (normal) 
 
(b) “nonself” (abnormal) 
 
4. Evaluation Framework for Detection Accuracy of the Immunity-Based System 
 
In the human body, nonself is divided into external nonself, such as bacteria and viruses, and 
internal nonself, such as tumor cells. Similarly, masqueraders are divided into masqueraders internal 
and external to the organization. For example, an internal masquerader may be a coworker who uses a 
computer without permission in some way, e.g., while the authentic user has left their desk. An 
external masquerader is a complete stranger to the organization who logs into a remote account on a 
remote server, such as the SSH or telnet server, by remotely cracking an account’s password or 
exploiting some vulnerability of the remote server. Hence, it is easy to monitor and collect the 
behavior of internal masqueraders, but it is more difficult to monitor external masqueraders because 
such users rarely intrude and often destroy all evidence of their intrusion. The difference in amount of 
information for user behavior between internal and external masqueraders may affect the accuracy of 
detection between the two types of non-legitimate user. Particularly, our system could be advantageous 
for the detection of internal masqueraders, because it makes full use of information regarding such 
ls  Æ emacs 
Æ gcc Æ rm 
Æ mkdir Æ 
gcc Æ …
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
My score is 75. 
My score is 10. 
My score is 55. 
My score is 20. 
The sequence is 
abnormal, 
since 20 < 62. 
User A on Account E
(Illegitimate use) 
My score is 69. 
Activated agent 
ls  Æ emacs 
Æ gcc Æ rm 
Æ mkdir Æ 
gcc Æ …  
A
B
C
D
E
My score is 75. 
My score is 10. 
My score is 55. 
My score is 20. 
My score is 69. 
The sequence is 
normal, 
since 69 > 62. 
Agent 
User A on Account A 
(Legitimate use) 
Activated agent Sensors 2009, 9                  
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non-legitimate users. Therefore, user behavior data for evaluation should be divided into internal and 
external user behavior data. 
Due to the difficulty in collecting external user data, the user data collected within the organization 
may be logically divided into internal and external user data. In this case, all combinations of internal 
and external users should be evaluated, as some users can be detected easily, while others will be more 
difficult. The total number of combinations may be extremely high in organizations with many users. 
Therefore, some of the combinations may be omitted to reduce the computation time. 
Evaluation of detection accuracy requires user behavior data for both normal users and 
masqueraders. The normal user data can be collected easily from the organization, but collecting 
masquerader data is more difficult. Thus, the masquerader behavior is simulated by testing one user’s 
behavior against another user’s profile. This simulation is based on the assumption that other user’s 
behavior will seem unusual for the original user. 
The metrics of detection accuracy are based on the false alarm rate (i.e., false positive rate) and 
missed alarm rate (i.e., false negative rate); the former is the rate at which the system falsely regards a 
legitimate user as a masquerader, while the latter is the rate at which the system falsely regards a 
masquerader as a legitimate user. 
We formulated the average false alarm rate as follows. Let FAij be the number of false alarms for 
the combination i and the user j. Then, the false alarm rate for the combination   and the user j is 
    
  , 
where K is the number of command sequences per user. The false alarm rate for the combination i is 
 
    ∑
    
 
    
    , where N
int is the number of internal users. Therefore, the average false alarm rate is: 
     
1
 
 
1
      
    
 
    
   
 
   
  (9) 
where    
    
      is the number of combinations of users, and      is the total number of users. 
Next, we formulate the average missed alarm rate for internal and external users. Let     
    be the 
number of missed alarms for internal users in the combination   with the internal user j. Then, the 
missed alarm rate for the combination   and the user j is 
    
   
         , where (N
int - 1)K
  is the total number 
of the other user’s command sequences. The missed alarm rate for the combination i is 
 
    ∑
    
   
         
    
    . Therefore, the average missed alarm rate for internal users is: 
        
1
 
 
1
      
    
   
       1   
    
   
 
   
(10) 
 
Let     
    be the number of missed alarms for external users in the combination i with the internal 
user j. As described above, the average missed alarm rate for external users is: Sensors 2009, 9                  
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1
 
 
1
      
    
   
              
    
   
 
   
(11) 
where N
all – N
int is the number of external users. 
In general, there is a tradeoff between the false alarm rate and the missed alarm rate. The relation of 
these rates can be described visually by a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve [23], which is 
a parametric curve generated by varying the threshold    from 0% to 100%, and computing these rates 
at each threshold   . The ROC curve of internal user detection is described by a trajectory for (FAR, 
MAR
int), and the ROC curve of external user detection is described by a trajectory for (FAR, MAR
ext). 
Both curves start from the upper left and go toward the lower right, varying threshold    from 0% to 
100%. The lower and further left the curve, the better. The ROC curve of random discrimination is 
almost equal to a diagonal line from the top left corner to the bottom right corner. In addition, the area 
under the ROC curve is a scalar measure for ROC analysis. The area under the ROC curve enables 
quantitative comparison of multiple ROC curves [23]. 
 
5. Experiments and Discussion 
 
5.1. Experimental Data and Configuration 
 
We used Schonlau’s masquerader data (http://www.schonlau.net/), which consists of 50 files, one 
for each user. Each file contains 150 command sequences generated with a process accounting acct. 
Each command sequence consists of 100 commands. Based on Schonlau’s works [7], the first 50 
command sequences for each user are the training data for constructing a profile. The next 100 
command sequences are test data for evaluating the performance of masquerader detection. Due to the 
difficulty of collecting external user data, the user data set is logically divided into internal and 
external user data. Only internal user data are used to construct profiles as training data, while both 
internal and external user data are used to evaluate their detection accuracy as test data. The 
masquerader behavior is simulated by testing one user’s command sequence against another user’s 
profile. Furthermore, we should evaluate all combinations of internal users among the 50 users in 
Schonlau’s data because the performance of masquerader detection would depend on the combinations. 
However, as the total number of combinations is very high, for each experiment, we used 1,000 
combinations chosen randomly from among all possible combinations. Hence, each point on the ROC 
curve is an average over 1,000 combinations. 
 
5.2. Analysis of Detection Accuracy 
 
5.2.1. Comparison of Detection Methods  
 
We investigated the detection accuracy of our immunity-based method in comparison with two 
single-sensor methods, i.e., the HMM method [2,3] and the uniqueness method [4]. The single-sensor Sensors 2009, 9                  
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HMM and uniqueness methods are among the best methods described previously [7,16]. Figure 3 
shows the ROC curves of internal and external masquerader detection for our method, the HMM 
method, and the uniqueness method. Table 1 shows the statistics of the area under the ROC curves for 
1,000 combinations of internal and external users. In each ROC curve, 25 internal users were chosen 
randomly from among the total of 50 users, and all the others were the external users. All agents were 
generated from command sequences of internal users. 
In Figure 3(a), the ROC curve for our method lies below the other two curves; this indicates that our 
method outperforms the other two methods. Figure 3(b) indicates that our method outperformed the 
other two methods with a false alarm rate of less than 1%. These performance improvements were 
because our method uses not only an activated agent but also the other internal user’s agents, while the 
other two methods use only an activated agent. That is, the use of multiple agents leads to 
improvement in masquerader detection accuracy. The HMM curve in Figure 3(a) is almost the same as 
that in Figure 3(b) because the single-sensor method of the HMM approach is independent of the 
combination of internal and external users. The uniqueness method is slightly better at detecting 
internal masqueraders than external masqueraders, because the uniqueness method is based on the 
relative difference of command frequency for internal users. 
 
Figure 3. ROC curves for detection of internal masqueraders (a) and external masqueraders 
(b) using our immunity-based method, the single-sensor HMM method and the uniqueness 
method. The parameters are as follows:     100,    100,    10,         ,      
25,       25,    1,000. The number of internal masqueraders is 25, and the number of 
external masqueraders is the same as that of internal masqueraders. The horizontal axis is a 
logarithmic scale, so we can focus on the missed alarm rate at the low false alarm rate. 
 
(a) Internal masquerader detection 
 
(b) External masquerader detection 
 
Comparing the internal and external masquerader detection rates of our method, as expected, the 
immunity-based method was better at detecting internal than external masqueraders (Figure 4). As 
mentioned in Section 4, the differences in the ROC curves would be due to the lack of information on 
external masqueraders. 
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Table 1. Statistics on the area under the ROC curves for detection of internal masqueraders 
and external masqueraders using our immunity-based method, the single-sensor HMM 
method and the uniqueness method. 
Method Masquerader  Mean  Standard  deviation 95% confidence interval 
Immunity-based Internal  0.04456  0.01001  0.04394 – 0.04518 
HMM  Internal  0.09442  0.01537  0.09347 – 0.09538 
Uniqueness  Internal  0.06435  0.01002  0.06373 – 0.06435 
Immunity-based  External  0.07375  0.01009  0.07312 – 0.07438 
HMM  External  0.09481  0.01526  0.09386 – 0.09575 
Uniqueness  External  0.07839  0.01004  0.07776 – 0.07902 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of ROC curves for detection of internal masqueraders and external 
masqueraders. The curves are the same as those in Figure 3. The horizontal axis is a 
logarithmic scale, so we can focus on the missed alarm rate at the low false alarm rate. 
 
5.2.2. Analysis of the number of internal users 
 
We investigated the effects of the number of internal users on detection accuracy. Figure 5 shows 
ROC curves for 5, 15, and 25 internal users, respectively, while keeping the number of external users 
at 25. The difference in length of the ROC curves is related to the number of agents, because 
discrimination between normal and abnormal is based on    and the scores of all agents as described 
in Section 3.3. 
In Figure 5, it might appear that the ROC curves largely overlap with each other, but the detection 
accuracy is slightly proportional to the number of internal users in Figure 5(b). That is, an increase in 
number of internal users may improve the detection accuracy of external masqueraders, although the 
detection accuracy is almost independent of the number of internal users. In Figure 5(b), the 
improvement of detection accuracy may be related to the diversity of agents. 
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Figure 5. ROC curves for the detection of internal masqueraders (a) and external 
masqueraders (b) for N
int = 5, 15 and 25 internal users. All other parameters are the same as 
those in Figure 3. The horizontal axis is a logarithmic scale, so we can focus on the missed 
alarm rate at the low false alarm rate. 
 
(a) Internal masquerader detection  (b) External masquerader detection 
 
5.2.3. Analysis of the number of agents 
 
We conceived the addition of agents to diversify agents inspired by the diversity of the immune 
system. To add new agents, we virtually divided 50 agents into internal agents, additional agents, and 
other agents randomly. The internal agents correspond to internal users. The additional agents 
correspond to neither internal users nor external users, i.e., external masqueraders. The other agents 
correspond to external masqueraders, and they are not used in detection evaluation. Briefly, the 
additional agents are constructed from actual command sequences of users other than internal users 
and external masqueraders. In the test evaluation, the additional agents compute the score for the most 
recently executed command sequence and present their own score to the activated agent as well as the 
internal agents, but the additional agents are not activated because they do not have their own account. 
Figure 6 shows ROC curves of internal and external masquerader detection for 0, 20, and 40 additional 
agents. The number of internal users is five, and the number of external users is five. In Figure 6(a), all 
curves are similar to each other, whereas in Figure 6(b), the detection accuracy is improved. Briefly, 
the addition of agents improves the detection accuracy of external masqueraders. In addition, the 
improvement in Figure 6(b) is similar to that in Figure 5(b). That is, the addition of agents seems to 
have the same effect as an increase in number of internal users. 
We now consider why only external masquerader detection is improved in Figure 6(b). Internal 
masquerader detection is improved if an agent that is specialized to recognize a specific internal user 
computes the highest score of all the agents against command sequences of the specific internal user 
corresponding to the agent. In contrast, external masquerader detection is improved if any additional 
agent computes the highest score of all the agents against command sequences of external 
masqueraders. Note that the additional agents must not compute the highest score against any 
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command sequences of internal users. Therefore, the addition of agents improves only external 
masquerader detection, while internal masquerader detection remains almost unchanged. 
Masquerader detection would be best achieved by adding agents specialized to recognize an 
external masquerader. Suppose that we add these agents in advance so that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between agents and masqueraders. The detection accuracy of external masqueraders 
would be similar to that of internal masqueraders. Briefly, addition of profiles should improve the 
detection accuracy of external masqueraders to the extent of that of internal masqueraders. In all the 
experiments, ROC curves of external masqueraders deviated from those of internal masqueraders, 
suggesting that the addition of agents could improve the detection accuracy of external masqueraders. 
 
Figure 6. ROC curves for detection of internal masqueraders (a) and external masqueraders 
(b) for the number of additional agents, keeping N
int = 5 and N
ext = 5. All other parameters 
are the same as in Figure 3. The horizontal axis is a logarithmic scale, so we can focus on 
the missed alarm rate at the low false alarm rate. 
 
(a) Internal masquerader detection 
 
(b) External masquerader detection 
 
5.2.4. Discussion of artificial diversification 
 
In the experiments shown in Figure 6, we added agents whose profiles were constructed from actual 
command sequences. In actual use, however, it would be necessary to generate additional agents, i.e., 
external user-specific agent, without actual masqueraders’ command sequences, as it is difficult to 
gather actual command sequences from masqueraders. One simple method of generating the external 
user-specific agents is random generation. However, random generation did not improve the detection 
accuracy because the scores computed from randomly generated profiles were remarkably low. Hence, 
the profile should be somewhat similar to internal user profiles to increase the score, but the score must 
not exceed that of the activated agent against command sequences of the user corresponding to the 
activated agent. 
This is similar to the mechanism involved in training of T-cells in the thymus, i.e., positive selection 
and negative selection. In the thymus, T-cells generate diverse T-cell receptor repertoires by cell 
division with gene rearrangement. The newly generated T-cells that recognize self major 
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histocompatibility complex (MHC) molecules are positively selected. They have various affinities for 
binding self MHC molecules. However, many of these T-cells are potentially harmful because their 
receptors have high affinity for a complex of self peptide and a self MHC molecule. These T-cells are 
negatively selected and eliminated. The surviving T-cells are exported from the thymus. They have 
weak affinity for self MHC molecules, which means they have the potential not only to recognize self 
MHC molecules, but also to recognize a foreign peptide complex. 
This similarity prompted us to apply a similar mechanism to the generation of external user-specific 
agents. We used a diversification mechanism to generate external user-specific agents that compute a 
low score for legitimate users’ command sequences, and a high score for external users’ command 
sequences. The flow of the mechanism is as follows: 
Step 1. A base HMM is constructed by averaging the HMMs of internal users. Note that the 
statistical properties of the base HMM are similar to those of an HMM estimated from all 
the command sequences of internal users. 
Step 2.   Artificial  command  sequences are generated using the base HMM. The command 
sequences can consist of the characteristics of the average user. 
Step 3.  An HMM is estimated from the artificial command sequences, and an agent associated 
with the HMM is generated. 
Step 4.  If the score computed by the agent is lower than the minimum of the scores computed by 
all internal user-specific agents, the agent is removed, i.e., all the other agents are positively 
selected (positive selection), and the process for generating the agents returns to Step 2. If 
the score computed by the agent is higher than the maximum of the scores computed by all 
internal user-specific agents, the agent is removed, i.e., all the others are negatively 
selected (negative selection), and the process returns to Step 2. 
Step 5. The agent is incorporated into the detection system and the process returns to Step 2 until 
the number of incorporated agents exceeds a specified number (e.g., 10 in our experiment). 
The incorporated agent could have the potential to recognize command sequences of 
external masqueraders. 
According to these steps, we generated more than 10 external user-specific agents and evaluated 
how the detection accuracy was improved. The number of internal users is 10, and the number of 
external users is 10. The base HMM is averaged over the HMMs of all internal users. The length of the 
command sequences generated by the base HMM is the same as that used in the training data. The 
number of the command sequences is 25. Figure 7 shows the ROC curves of 10 external user-specific 
agents and no additional agents. The detection accuracy for more than 10 external user-specific agents 
is almost the same as that for 10 external user-specific agents. 
The curve with 10 external user-specific agents was better at detecting external masqueraders, but 
not quite as good at detecting internal masqueraders. Therefore, the diversification mechanism is good 
at tightening the security for external masqueraders rather than internal masqueraders. 
The detection accuracy of internal masquerader detection deteriorates when at least one external 
user-specific agent computes a score higher than that of the activated agent against command Sensors 2009, 9                  
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sequences of internal users. One reason for the external user-specific agent computing a higher score is 
that the upper threshold for negative selection is high. To avoid this, the threshold could be lowered, 
but this would be at the expense of accuracy for detecting external masqueraders. Another reason is 
that the activated agent computes a very low score when the user uses commands not included in the 
training data.  
With regard to Figure 7(b), the reason why the detection accuracy of external masqueraders is 
improved is that any external user-specific agent computes the highest score of all the agents against 
command sequences of external masqueraders. Briefly, the external user-specific agents can recognize 
unknown external users. 
 
Figure 7. ROC curves of internal masquerader detection (a) and external masquerader 
detection (b) for 10 external user-specific agents and no additional agents. The parameters 
are as follows: N
int = 10, N
ext = 10. All other parameters are the same as those in Figure 3. 
The length of the command sequences generated by the base HMM is the same as that in 
the training data. The number of command sequences is 25. 
 
(a) Internal masquerader detection 
 
(b) External masquerader detection 
 
5.2.5. Analysis of HMM parameters 
 
The HMM would have some parameters that affect the detection accuracy. The variable parameters 
of the HMM are the number N of hidden states, the minimum probability δ of the command probability 
distribution, the length L of test sequences, and the number K of training command sequences. 
We investigated the number of hidden states from 1 to 50. All the other parameters are the same as 
those in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 8, all curves largely overlapped with each other. In contrast to 
our expectations, the detection accuracy is independent of the number of hidden states. Our 
expectations were based on our previous report that detection accuracy for the single-sensor HMM 
method was positively correlated with the number of hidden states [3]. This may have been due to 
differences in experimental data between our previous study and the present study. The experimental 
data provided by Schonlau depends the frequency of specific commands rather than that of chains of 
specific commands in contrast to the experimental data used in our previous study. We can set the 
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number of hidden states to 1, which has the lowest computational cost, because the detection accuracy 
is independent of the number of hidden states. 
 
Figure 8. ROC curves for internal masquerader detection (a) and external masquerader 
detection (b) for the number of hidden states. All other parameters are the same as those 
in Figure 3. 
 
(a) Internal masquerader detection 
 
(b) External masquerader detection 
 
The minimum probability allows us to control the score of test sequences that include commands 
not seen in the training data. In fact, the significant small probability could improve the detection 
accuracy of the single-sensor method of the HMM [3]. However, similar to the number of hidden 
states, the minimum probability is unrelated to detection accuracy (Figure 9). This may be because of 
differences in discrimination methods; in the immunity-based method, discrimination is based on the 
relative evaluation of scores computed by multiple sensor agents, while in the single-sensor method 
discrimination is based only on the one score. Briefly, the relative evaluation of scores negates the 
effect of the minimum probability. 
 
Figure 9. ROC curves of internal masquerader detection (a) and external masquerader 
detection (b) for the minimum probability. All other parameters are the same as those in 
Figure 3. 
 
(a) Internal masquerader detection 
 
(b) External masquerader detection 
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Similar to the length of command sequences, the ROC curves did not overlap with each other 
(Figure 10). As expected, the longer the length, the greater the improvement in detection accuracy.  
Figure 11 shows the ROC curves of internal masquerader detection and external masquerader 
detection according to the number of training command sequences. Similar to the length of command 
sequences, the greater the number of command sequences, the greater the improvement in detection 
accuracy. It is noteworthy that detection accuracy is improved markedly by varying the number of 
training sequences from 10 to 20. 
 
Figure 10. ROC curves for detection of internal masqueraders (a) and external 
masqueraders (b) according to the length of test sequences. All other parameters are the 
same as those in Figure 3. 
 
(a) Internal masquerader detection 
 
(b) External masquerader detection 
 
Figure 11. ROC curves for detection of internal masqueraders (a) and external 
masqueraders (b) for the number of training sequences. All other parameters are the same 
as those in Figure 3. 
 
(a) Internal masquerader detection 
 
(b) External masquerader detection 
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6. Conclusions 
 
A new immunity-based anomaly detection system with sensor agents for detecting masqueraders 
was developed and evaluated. This immunity-based system utilizes multiple sensors, which can 
improve detection accuracy compared to single-sensor methods. In addition, an evaluation framework 
for the immunity-based anomaly detection system was proposed. The evaluation framework is capable 
of evaluating the differences in detection accuracy between internal and external masqueraders.  
Evaluation results can be summarized as follows: 
z  The new immunity-based method outperformed the single-sensor HMM and uniqueness 
methods. 
z  An increase in number of internal users slightly improved the detection accuracy of external 
masqueraders, although the detection accuracy was almost independent of the number of 
internal users. 
z  The addition of agents improved the detection accuracy of external masqueraders, although the 
detection accuracy was almost independent of the number of additional agents. 
z  The proposed diversification mechanism is useful for tightening security against external 
masqueraders rather than internal masqueraders. 
We are currently developing an adaptation mechanism that will make it possible to update a profile, 
i.e., to reestimate the parameters of the HMM for newly executed command sequences that the 
immunity-based system classified as “self”. Updating of a profile would enable agents to adapt to a 
change in user behavior, and would be expected to improve detection accuracy. 
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